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IDC to Drill 37 Wells at Zubair Oil Field

By John Lee.

The Iraqi Drilling Company (IDC) has signed a contract with Schlumberger to provide drilling services for 37 oil wells in the Al-Zubair field in Basra for the Italian company ENI, which will operate the field.

The Director General of the Iraqi Drilling Company, Basem Abdul Karim, said that the contract includes the operation of the two drilling rigs IDC 37 and IDC 38.

The targeted reservoirs in this project are the Mishref reservoir, Nahr Bin Omar, and the Zubair reservoir, where new drilling operations contribute to increasing the production capacity of the aforementioned field.

(Source: Ministry of Oil)

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IOC’s Strategic Positioning in Iraqi Upstream Petroleum

By Ahmed Mousa Jiyad.

Any opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

IOC’s Strategic Positioning in Iraq Upstream Petroleum

Much talk have been circulating recently on “Big Oil” abandoning Iraq upstream petroleum projects after they rushed into the country many years ago. How much truth is in this; who is leaving, remaining and planning a comeback; why and what material evidences are available to provide verifiable realistic explanation are some of the topics this brief intervention attempts to address.

IOCs positioning in Iraq upstream petroleum have seen a dramatic shift since a Grand Opining Big Push Policy- GOBPP was pursued in 2004; offering IOCs opportunities to achieving unprecedented expansion in the petroleum production capacity during short period.

Their involvement and strategic positioning went through three phases: the first, 2004 to end 2008, comprises many memoranda of understanding/cooperation (MoU/Cs ) in search for foothold and as springboard for further opportunities; transparent competitive bidding phase, June 2009 to May 2012, includes four bid rounds and, third phase covers contracts implementation that began from January 2010 up to date.

Ministry of Oil- MoO concluded some 40 MoU/Cs with IOCs from 23 countries, with overwhelming dominance of the US (9); Japan and Norway (4 each); China, UAE, UK and Canada (2 each) and one company from 16 countries.

For IOCs, MoU/Cs represent invaluable direct contact with Iraqi staff and professionals at all layers of responsibility and access to most archives and database relating to upstream petroleum; that helped IOCs exploring where and what they could do to chart their way towards business in Iraq’s upstream petroleum and beyond, i.e., to plan their strategic positioning in the sector. Some IOCs had their MoU/C terminated and were blacklisted from further involvement in upstream petroleum projects, due to their agreements with KRG in violation of the government declared policy.

MoU/Cs contributed in formulating and development of a model contract, and by the time they were terminated MoO succeeded, through direct government-to-government talks (with China), in converting Alahdab oilfield from production sharing to service contract. That conversion presents the model for what MoO offers: a long term service contract not a production sharing contract; an outcome many IOCs had not hoped for and probably impacted their decision for further undertaking.

The first bid round, for brown oilfields, was held end June 2009, followed by three bid rounds for green fields, gas fields and exploration blocks respectively; the last was convened end May 2012.

120 IOCs participated in the qualification process for the bid rounds, 55 from 27 countries were qualified: Japan (9); USA (7); Russia (5); China and UK (4 each); Australia, India and Italy (2 each), and 19 other countries with one company each; a different profile from phase one with obvious strategic positioning implications.

The outcome of the four bid rounds and Alahdab are: 14 oilfields contracted to 15 IOCs from 12 countries; a consolidation of strategic positioning. Total contracted plateau production was 12.3mbd and their total proven reserves ca. 67 billion barrels (58% of the country’s proven reserves at that time). Three gas fields were contracted to 3 IOCs from 3 countries with total plateau production of 820mcfd and proven reserves of 11.2tcf. Finally, four exploration blocks were contracts with 7 IOCs from 5 countries resulting in discovery of Fayha and Eridu oilfields.

The contracted plateau production of 12.3mbd was IOCs making that proven to be unrealistic and unattainable, thus, consequently revised downward repeatedly!!

During the second phase many meaningful signs for significant shift in IOCs strategic positioning began to emerge, the most apparent consolidation was Russia.

The third phase, i.e., contracts implementation period, witnessed the most dramatic effective and lasting shifts in IOCs strategic positioning.

A complexity of combined reasons had contributed to such an outcome; some are related to IOCs themselves, others related to the Iraqi side (entities, policies and circumstances), while the rest are related to a variety of international factors and geopolitical considerations. Space limitation prevents from indulging in the details of relevant data, facts and documents, but it is useful to mention the most impacting among them: Fracking revolution in the US; ISIS and oil price collapse in mid-June 2014 that inflicted serious blow to Iraq fiscal, security and developmental efforts; OPEC+ impact on Iraq production; Covid-19 and finally energy/green transition and climate change debate.

However, it is vital to highlight briefly the IOCs that strengthened or weakened their positions during this phase.

In the context of Iraqi GOBPP, strategic positioning is taken here to mean IOCs persistent, competitive, enhanced and long-term underrating in Iraq upstream petroleum. Three dimensions manifest IOC involvement and its strategic positioning: horizontal (in multi-fields), vertical (the participating interest-PI in the fields) and volumetric (in terms of proven reserves and production due to field development).

From November 2013 China began enhancing its presence in the country through consolidating CNPC , CNOOC, ZhenHua , Sinopec , UEG and probably CPECC, which   invests in utilizing all associated gas produced in Missan Province . In addition to the above, there are many Chines service companies that are involved in upstream petroleum activities such as drilling, supply and construct surface installations, pipelines, field management among others.

Russian Lukoil enhanced its position vertically horizontally and volumetric in West Qurna 2-WQ2 oilfield and in exploration Block 10 that led to Eridu oilfield discovery; Lukoil found other reservoirs beyond the field’s current borders and thus requested to expand Eridu field. Surprisingly, the Oil Minister reportedly said recently Lukoil intends to sell its PI in WQ2 to a Chines company!

Other Russian IOCs with bid round contracts include Gazprom (operator of Badra oilfield) and Bashneft/ Rosneft (for Exploration Block 12), KRG not included here.

In addition to Chines and Russian IOCs Japanese companies increased their presence as well: Japex (Gharraf oilfield); INPEX (Exploration Block 10/Eridu oilfield) and Itochu bought entire Shell’ PI (20%) in WQ1.

Against the consolidation of the Chines, Russian and Japanese companies, other IOCs lost or weakened their presence in upstream petroleum; these include Big Oil- as ExxonMobil, Shell and Oxy and medium-small size companies such as Petronas, Kogas, Kuwait Energy, TPAO.

Occidental Petroleum relinquished, in 2016, its PI in Zubair oilfield to South Oil Company (now Basra Oil Company), due to its decision pulling out from projects in the Middle East for financial reasons.

ExxonMobil demise began almost ten years ago soon after it had attained significant consolidation; a demise of its own making!! Apart from the contribution of the Iraqi factors ExxonMobil faced and facing many other challenges that exacerbate its decision to abandon Iraq. These include restructuring its international profile; energy transition (away from fossil-based to renewable-energy) environmentally-conscious; shareholder revolts, expulsion of ExxonMobil representative from EITI’MSG due to position regarding Dobb-Franck issue and the forthcoming SEC environmental compliance rules.

Royal Shell story is not very different from that of ExxonMobil. Shell launched initially a powerful strategic positioning, resisted the temptation of engaging with KRG petroleum and diversified its portfolio in oil, gas and petrochemical projects. Now it has much weakened role; withdrew from Majnoon oilfield, sold its PI in WQ1, rumors that it contemplate leaving Basra Gas Compan- BGC , whose  HoA was signed in 2008 but it did not deliver the contracted target, and Nibras petrochemical project, with MIM & MoO, draggeed for too many years without any prospect.

Again, Shell decision to leave WQ1 and Majnoon oilfields and possibly BGC was not entirely due to contractual and working conditions in Iraq; one possible explanation relates to Shell’ overall plan to restructure its global business, following its takeover of British Gas Group- BGG. Also Shell faces legal action; A Dutch court ruled, recently, that Shell will have to reduce its carbon emissions by 45 percent from 2019 levels by 2030.

BP has only one engagement- Rumaila oilfield, with almost equal PI with CNPC (while during the June 2009 bidding round BP’ PI was double that of CNPC). Recently, BP decided to spin off its involvement in Rumaila into a stand-alone company, a “ring fencing practice”, for reasons relating to diverting its global assets and investment plans.  Though this move is more structural and organizational in nature that has, contractually, no effect on Iraq, it, nevertheless, could indicate possible departure from Rumaila sooner or later.

Total, rebranded TotalEnergies, have very modest PI in only one oilfield- Halfaya, is trying a comeback to Iraq through concluding HoA comprising four major projects, three of which are part of SIIP that Iraq wasted too many years discussing with ExxonMobil!!

Surely, IOCs strategic positioning has significant implications for petroleum sector and the prospect of the entire economy. There has been a tendency for some to be highly selective by focusing only on one Iraqi based, real reason, such as harsh contractual terms; type of contracts; corruption, resource mismanagement and security conditions among others. While all these are real and effective, they are absolutely not the only factors behind IOCs shift and change of priorities as there is a complex wed that one should be aware of; 20 IOCs have recently warned for tax violation and IOCs that lost their strategic positioning inside Iraqi petroleum had themselves contributed to that outcome.

Moreover, global energy/green transition and international geopolitics have powerful ramifications though the debate is, as usual, not conclusive. While IEA recent report could have effective impact, REN21 new report raises doubt; and such wide divergence suggests oil remains needed much longer than some thinks.

Click here to download the full report in pdf format.

Mr Jiyad is an independent development consultant, scholar and Associate with the former Centre for Global Energy Studies (CGES), London. He was formerly a senior economist with the Iraq National Oil Company and Iraq’s Ministry of Oil, Chief Expert for the Council of Ministers, Director at the Ministry of Trade, and International Specialist with UN organizations in Uganda, Sudan and Jordan. He is now based in Norway (Email: mou-jiya(at)online.no, Skype ID: Ahmed Mousa Jiyad). Read more of Mr Jiyad’s biography here.

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The Demise of ExxonMobil in the Iraqi Petroleum Sector

By Ahmed Mousa Jiyad.

Any opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

The Demise of ExxonMobil in the Iraqi Petroleum Sector

A recent announcement by the Ministry of Oil (MoO) confirms months of speculation regarding ExxonMobil exiting one of the world’s super-giant oilfields, i.e. West Qurna 1 (WQ1).

Ten years ago this highly recognized IOC had golden opportunity to operate three giant oilfields in the southern Iraq with a combined production plateau of 6.275 million barrels daily (mbd); an opportunity unavailable anywhere in the world, but now this company exiting the country empty-handed!!

Why was that? What went wrong? Who is to blame? Should any lessons be learned from this failed venture and what are the implications for Iraq as well as for ExxonMobil?

This article attempts to answer briefly the above questions and provide background review that could help in understand the complexity of the circumstances that contributed to and led to this eventuality.

ExxonMobil back in Iraq

IOCs comeback to Iraqi upstream petroleum began in earnest immediately after 2003 invasion.

ExxonMobil was one of too many IOCs that concluded Memorandum of Understanding/ Cooperation- MoU/C with MoO in 2004. That MoU/C was signed on 27 October 2004, renewed twice and remained valid until end of 2008; it comprises conducting seven joint studies and training. The joint studies includes: phases 1 &2 for the development of Zubair Oilfield; Seismic and evaluation study for exploration (old) block 12; Database; Model Tender Document  for exploration block 12; Rehabilitating Oil Training Center in Baghdad; Balad Oilfield; Deep drilling program for South Rumaila. Also, ExxonMobil committed to provide training for 129 MoO employees, totaling 1068 working days, during 2005 and 2006.

When MoO decided to hold the first bid round, ExxonMobil was one of seven American companies that were qualified, among 35 IOCs, for participating in the bid round that was held on 29 and 30 June 2009.

ExxonMobil formed three consortia and submitted bids for three oilfields but won nothing during the two days of the competition.

The first consortium with Petronas for Rumaila oilfield; eventually BP/CNPC won when they reduced their remuneration fee to the threshold stated by MoO;

The second consortium with Shell and Petronas for Zubair oilfield competing with three other consortia: Eni/Sinopec/Occidental/Kogas; CNPC/BP; Gazprom/ ONGC/ Turkish Petroleum. The third consortium with Shell for West Qurna1 oilfield competing with four other consortia: CNPC/Petronas/Japex; Lukoil/Conoco; Total; Repsol/StatoilHydro/Maersk.

None won during the biding event.

In October 2009, ENI accepted the MoO’ maximum remuneration fee and agreed to expel Sinopec from its consortium, because Sinopec agreed, days after the biding event, to a C$8.3bn (US$7.2bn) takeover of Addax, which had a stake in the KR TaqTaq field. Hence, ENI consortium secured the Zubair contract.

As for WQ1 it was a totally different story.

Early October 2009 a BBC Monitoring report quoted Lukoil boss Vagit Alekperov had said, “We have let it be known to Iraq’s Oil Ministry that the consortium of Lukoil and ConocoPhillips is ready to enter into direct talks concerning the West Qurna-1 project on the terms that were announced earlier by Iraq’s Oil Ministry,”

Probably, ExxonMobil found itself left behind and empty-handed from the first bid round since BP/CNPC won Rumaila; ENI lead consortium secured Zubair and now Lukoil and ConocoPhillips conceding to MoO terms regarding WQ1. Moreover, ExxonMobil had no intention to participate in the second bid round to be held in December 2010.

All the above prompted ExxonMobil/Shell, four weeks after Lukoil and ConocoPhillips announcement, to present similar acceptance of MoO terms regarding the maximum remuneration fee.

The Ministry favoured ExxonMobil/Shell by not considering Lukoil/ConocoPhillips offer promptly, and when ExxonMobil/Shell made their offer it was selected; presumably due to suggested production plateau target-PPT differential that tilted towards ExxonMobil/Shell!!! The Cabinet approved the award of WQ1 to ExxonMobil/Shell on 25 January 2010.

But ExxonMobil negotiated secretly with KRG after the company secured WQ1 contract with the federal ministry and it had signed the second amendment to the contract on 18 August 2010 adding 500kbd to an already high PPT at a higher remuneration fee of $2/b.

ExxonMobil-KRG secret negotiation led to signing six production sharing agreements on 18 October 2011, though it knows of the blacklisting policy by the federal ministry of oil, i.e, ignoring and disregarding the federal government imposed policy.

Contracts with KRG add insult into injury since three of these contracts are related to exploration blocks and fields that fall within the “disputed territories”; these are Bashiqa, Al Qosh and Qara Hanjeer, the other three are Arbat East, Pirmam and Betwata.

That unwise and puzzling move by ExxonMobil led to excluding it from leading the Common Seawater Supply Project-CSSP; reducing its Participating Interest in WQ1 (through the Third Amendment of the contract dated 28 November 2013) and blacklisting it from any future upstream projects such as Nassiriya Integrated Project-NIP.

That unwise action was writing on the wall that had in fact commenced the demise of this giant IOC in the Iraqi upstream petroleum.

The position of ExxonMobil in WQ1 weekend further when Shell exited WQ1 after it had exited Majnoon oilfield in June 2018.

ExxonMobil attempted a comeback to Iraqi petroleum, by exploiting the naivety and narcissism of a former Minister of Oil, Jabbar Luaibi, through Southern Iraq Integrated Project- SIIP. He and ExxonMobil were close to trap Iraq in an Odious Contract. The Ministry of Oil was cautioned of the detrimental consequences of such a contract and luckily for Iraq that contract was dismissed.

The rise and fall of ExxonMobil in KRI was even more dramatic despite the fact that KRG offered lucrative production sharing agreements. Media sources’ report that ExxonMobil had conducted geological studies that doubted the existence of enough reserves in most of these blocks. Such results prompted Exxon to relinquish three of its six blocks: Betwata in 2015, and Qara Hanjeer and Arbat East in 2016.

Of Exxon’s six blocks, Bashiqa may be the most promising.  However, in 2017, it transferred half of its 80 percent interest in this block – along with operatorship – to DNO and early this year it agreed to sell 32 percent to DNO, which practically and effectively ends ExxonMobil involvement in this block. Finally, ten years on with no much progress in AlQosh and Primam.

ExxonMobil adventure in Kurdistan Iraq ended, mostly, miserably!

To sum up, in that first biding round the company had three valuable opportunities and, analytically and legally, it and its partners could have won all three super-giant oilfields (Rumaila, Zubair and WQ1) with a combined production plateau of 6.275 million barrels daily-mbd against a combined minimum PPT proposed by MoO of 2.758 mbd; it won nothing during the bidding event!!!!!!!!!.

Instead, ExxonMobil sought a divisive course of action in the domestic Iraqi politics by concluding ill-fated PSAs with KRG; was that due to lack of vision, or geopolitical nativity or arrogance that still reflects a “Seven Sisters” mentality, or a hidden political agenda aiming at disintegrating the country; who knows!!!!!

What went wrong with ExxonMobil and its economic model?

Many views argued that the fiscal terms of the Iraqi long term service contract-LTSC for WQ1 are tough enough that eradicate the Internal Rate of Returns-IRR of the economic model which the IOC premised its final investment decision-FID on it.

This might be partially true as the comparative analysis of LTSC with other types of contract, particularly the production sharing contracts-PSCs indicates the “Government take” are higher under the LTSC than the PSCs. This, from international energy political economy perspectives is good for Iraq and, moreover, that corresponds with the Iraqi constitutional provision that calls for “develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people” (Article 112, Second)

Nevertheless, contractually and analytically LTSC for WQ1is identical in structure, contents and fiscal terms, except the particularities of WQ1 oilfield,  to all LTSCs for the brown fields offered under the first bid round, i.e, Rumaila, Zubair and the 3 Missan oilfields- Buzurgan, Abu Ghrab and Faqa. This leads one to question why ExxonMobil finds the fiscal terms unfavorable while other IOCs continue in the redevelopment of the oilfields.

It took almost one year to prepare for the first bid round and the final text of the LTSC was thoroughly examined by all qualified IOCs for that bid round. Logically and imperially, all IOCs should have formulated their economic model and bid on what the LTSC offers. It is rather surprising to claim, ten years later, that the offered fiscal terms do not match with the company economic model!!

The economic model of any IOC is its own making; reflecting its vision, its global profile, strategic positioning, strengths, and stakeholder/shareholder’s interests among other things. Accordingly, the level of IRR is the fiscal measure upon which the FID premised. Majors or Big Oil usually have high IRR, due to their international profile , their integrated structure across the value chain of petroleum industry and the “opportunity cost” of a particular investment.

IRR under LTSC fiscal terms depends mostly and directly on: production level, capital cost-investment, cost recovery and remuneration fee; indirectly it depends on oil prices through the term of “deemed revenues” provision that impact the quarterly cost recovery and remuneration fee entitlement.

Oil price fluctuates, and nothing new about that at all; its fluctuation like a “Yu-Yu” is more normal and usual than otherwise. Iraqi oil export price averaged at $53.19 a barrel during the 12 months period November 2008-October 2009; the time that IOCs considered oil prices in their economic model. During the period from July 2008 to March 2021 Iraqi oil export price averaged at $69.55 a barrel; hence the argument that IRR eradication was attributed to oil prices and, accordingly on cost recovery and remuneration fee is not convincing.

What remains is the impact of oil production level on IRR value. Oil production levels have implications and direct impact on capital cost, cost recovery and remuneration fee, and hence on IRR.

For WQ1 the MoO requests a minimum plateau target of 600kbd during the first bid round. ExxonMobil presented 2.325mbd, i.e., nearly four folds what MoO had envisaged!! Moreover, soon after signing the contract ExxonMobil requested adding further 500kbd leading to higher plateau target at 2.825mbd.

ExxonMobil should have known that such unreasonable unattainable plateau target within the contracted timeframe weakens the logical premises of its economic model and the assumed IRR; it was a problem of its own making and shed much doubt about the validity and soundness of its model not the LTSC stringent fiscal terms.

However, Amendment 4, signed on 19 February 2014, to WQ1 contract, provides further relieves from the terms of the contract such as reducing the plateau target, performance factor and R-Factor among others that provide significant fiscal incentives to WQ1 consortium.

All the above refutes the argument that put the blame squarely on the terms of the contract in the deteriorating IRR and ExxonMobil economic model.

Even if one, for the sake of the argument, accepts for a while the tough terms of WQ1 contract, what about ExxonMobil economic model for KRG’ PSCs!!

All commentators and oil experts agree that KRG’ PSCs provide lucrative terms for the benefits of the IOCs. Why then ExxonMobil fails measurably there too?

Was that demise due to wrongly-premised economic model or “inside-misguidedness”!! Media sources revealed that Ali Khedery, a former American diplomatic advisor in Iraq who subsequently joined Exxon as director of public and government affairs for ExxonMobil Kurdistan Region of Iraq Limited (EMKRIL), Exxon’s KRG-focused subsidiary, “had facilitated the negotiations that brought the company to Kurdistan.” Was ExxonMobil victimized by its own staffer!!!!???

ExxonMobil Exit and MoO Options

Contractually, to exit WQ1, ExxonMobil should invoke the termination Article 8 in WQ1 service contract, particularly sub-article (8.2) and, therein, sub-article (8.1 (c)). If ExxonMobil wishes to assign its rights and obligations, as it seems doing so far, it should comply with the provisions of Article 28-Assignment.

Available information indicates that the company launched the contractually exiting process in January by sending a formal letter to notify MoO it had found prospective buyers; ExxonMobil and MoO had three months, until 28 April, to agree on a course of action.

The ministry has three options: the first is to accept the prospective buyers found by ExxonMobil; 20 percent to CNOOC and 12.7 percent to PetroChina-CNPC. This means increasing CNPC participating interest to 45.4% and increase China position in WQ1 to 65.4%.

The second option is to find another American company to acquire ExxonMobil share; this what the Ministry has publically announced and it seems to favour Chevron, but Chevron  was reportedly not hugely encouraged to invest in WQ1. (But again Chevron was blacklisted by the Ministry due to the company’ involvement in KRG oilfields, though such blacklisting was revoked, unofficially, during the time of former minister Jabbar Luaibi. He paving the way for this company to enter the upstream petroleum through direct backdoor. By the way the Iraqi team in MoU/C with Chevron 2004-2008 was chaired by Jabbar Luaibi).

The third option is to acquire ExxonMobil share by the Ministry through Basra Oil Company-BOC or any other national companies affiliated under the Ministry. This option is similar to what was done when Occidental – Oxy relinquished its participating interest in Zubair oilfield

In any of these options, the Ministry should extract a “capital gain tax-CGT” from the total value of the sold share. The Iraqi tax authority decides the CGT rate, the estimation equation and the compounding rate to arrive at the present values taking into consideration three related variables: the value of the sold share (minus) the present value of the invested capital (plus) the present value of the recovered invested capital (cost recovery).

In my article written almost twelve years ago assessing the first bid round I wrote the following: “What is rather surprising is the somewhat weak contribution of the American oil companies. While they topped the 35 qualified IOCs with 7 companies, only three had participated in the bidding. Were they expected to capitalise on the American military presence and political pressure to have guaranteed access to the Iraqi oil? Or they simply have their own capacity, technical and financial limitations? Or Iraq is not on their strategic priority screen? Or they are trapped in a mind-set of own making that centred on production sharing agreements and “reserves booking”? Or they are not used to this type of open bidding and transparency, and they prefer behind closed doors deals? Only time would provide the satisfactory answer.” (MEES 52:33 17 August 2009)

Any lessons learned, Ministry of Oil????????

Click here to download the full report in pdf format.

Mr Jiyad is an independent development consultant, scholar and Associate with the former Centre for Global Energy Studies (CGES), London. He was formerly a senior economist with the Iraq National Oil Company and Iraq’s Ministry of Oil, Chief Expert for the Council of Ministers, Director at the Ministry of Trade, and International Specialist with UN organizations in Uganda, Sudan and Jordan. He is now based in Norway (Email: mou-jiya(at)online.no, Skype ID: Ahmed Mousa Jiyad). Read more of Mr Jiyad’s biography here.

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New Contracts for Iraqi Drilling Company (IDC)

By John Lee.

The Iraqi Drilling Company (IDC) has announced its intention to conclude contracts with Chinese and American companies operating in Iraq to drill and rehabilitate dozens of oil wells in the country.

The company indicated it is about to start drilling 20 wells in the Nasiriyah field in Dhi Qar, which are included in a long-term plan with the Dhi Qar Oil Company (DQOC) to advance the oil sector, due to be completed in over two years.

After the relative relaxation of the impacts of the coronavirus, the Iraqi Drilling Company resumed its negotiations with the international companies developing oil fields in the country and their counterparts affiliated with the Ministry of Oil in the provinces, in preparation for signing the postponed contracts with the aim of enhancing Iraq’s energy capabilities.

The drilling and rehabilitation contracts, hoped to be concluded soon, include drilling 37 wells in the Zubair field for the Italian company ENI, the main operator of the field, and starting discussions with BP, the main contractor in the Rumaila field, to develop the giant field west of Basra.

This is in addition to the near signing of a contract to drill 43 wells in Majnoon field with the Basra Oil Company (BOC), which is the third largest oil field in the world, with reserves of 6.12 billion barrels.

The Iraqi Drilling Company has completed all its preparations to sign a contract with the Central Oil Company, to drill 27 wells in the East Baghdad field, and it continues its discussions with the Maysan [Missan] Oil Company (MOC) to sign a contract for drilling 22 wells in the Bazargan field as well as rehabilitating another 150 wells and a contract to operate a number of drilling towers and rehabilitation of a large number of wells in the Kirkuk fields with the North Oil Company (NOC).

(Source: Govt of Iraq)

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GE Synchronizes Gas Turbines at Zubair Power Plant

By John Lee.

GE Gas Power has said it has “marked a major milestone” by synchronizing two GT13E2 gas turbines to the national grid at the Zubair Permanent Power Generation Plant.

The facility is owned by the Basra Oil Company (BOC) and located at the Zubair oil field, about 20 kilometers from the city of Basra.

ENI Iraq B.V. is responsible for developing the oil field and had awarded a contract to GE for the engineering, procurement, installation and commissioning of the power plant.

Two other GT13E2 units at the site had previously been synchronized to the grid in summer 2020. The new additions have taken the total generation capacity of the site up to 700 megawatts (MW).

Joseph Anis, President & CEO of GE Gas Power in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia, said:

“With Iraq’s population growing at over 2 percent per year, the demand for reliable, affordable electricity continues to increase. Every megawatt added to the grid can make a significant impact to the quality of life of the Iraqi people. 

“GE is honored to work together with ENI to support the country’s socioeconomic development by delivering much-needed electricity to power growth and prosperity for present and future generations.“

(Source: GE)

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Eni to Invest $4bn in Iraqi Refinery?

By John Lee.

Italian oil company ENI is reported to be in talks to build a $4-billion, 300,000-bpd refinery near Iraq’s Zubair oil field.

S&P Global quotes Oil Minister Ihsan Ismaael [Ahsan Abdul-Jabbar Ismail] as saying that that the first phase, with a capacity of 150,000 bpd, would be operational by 2025.

The Minster reportedly added that the Zubair field, in which Eni holds a stake, is expected to produce 700,000 bpd by 2027.

Click here to read the full article.

(Source: S&P Global)

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Shamara to provide Power for Basra Gas Plant

By John Lee.

The Basrah Gas Company (BGC) and Shamara Holding have reportedly signed a contract under which Shamara will supply electricity to the Basra Natural Gas plant.

According to The National, the contract will enable the plant to process by-product gas that would other wise be flared from the Rumaila, Zubair and West Qurna-1 oilfields for use by Iraq power stations.

The Basra NGL facility will be built in Ar-Ratawi area in west of Basra and is scheduled to complete at the end of 2020.

More here.

(Source: The National)

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Intertek opens Iraq’s first Independent Hydrocarbon Lab

Intertek, the UK-based assurance, inspection, product testing and certification company, has announced the launch of the first independent crude oil, fuel testing and petroleum products laboratory in Iraq.

The new hydrocarbon laboratory, located in the port of Khor Al Zubair, will support the increased demand for quality assurance solutions in the petroleum industry across Iraq and will soon be offering octane engine fuel testing of gasoline for the first time in the country.

The launch of the 1,300 square feet laboratory allows Intertek to offer its services in this fast-growing market and in this highly strategic location. Khor Al Zubair incorporates industrial areas that are home to several petrochemical and other companies that will benefit from the proximity of the laboratory services to their operations. The nine jetties in the port of Khor Al Zubair are vital for fuel imports and exports in Iraq and enable direct access for crude carriers, refiners, distributors and trade companies.

Based within SKA Energy’s new oil storage terminal, the laboratory represents a significant investment in the Iraq oil and gas industry. Offering a wide range of services for the petroleum and related industries, the laboratory will deliver sample testing, and services for the downstream oil and gas and aviation sectors.

It will also provide detailed crude oil, naphtha and gasoline quality analysis and testing, which helps clients maintain or improve fuel quality to meet commercial and regulatory specifications. The facility will offer 24/7 operations and trouble-shooting support.

Matthew Skinner, Intertek Regional Managing Director Gulf and Pakistan, said:

“As the demand for Assurance services in Iraq grows, we are delighted to have achieved an industry first in opening this laboratory.

“Our new facility in Khor Al Zubair allows us to cater for the needs of numerous parties operating within the oil and gas industry in Iraq, providing our customers with systemic Total Quality Assurance Solutions. Local companies can now obtain lab reports to help them assess their fuels in accordance with industry international standards, at a shorter turnaround time.”

(Source: Intertek)

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Halliburton Wins New Drilling Contract in Iraq

US-based oil services company Halliburton has today announced it has signed two contracts with Eni Iraq BV to provide integrated drilling services at Eni’s Zubair oilfield in Southern Iraq.

Under the contracts, Halliburton will mobilize four to six rigs to drill development wells over the next two years.

Mahmoud El-Kady, vice president of the Iraq Area for Halliburton, said:

“We are pleased to be awarded this work and the opportunity to collaborate with Eni to engineer solutions for the development of Zubair.

“We have provided a wide array of drilling services to Eni since 2011 and signing these contracts are a testimony to our continuous commitment to safety and superior service quality.”

(Source: Halliburton)

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BGC to Increase Gas Output by 16% by end-Dec

By John Lee.

The Basra Gas Company (BGC) is expected to increase production from its current level of 900 million cubic feet per day (mcf/d) to 1,050 mcf/d by the end of this year.

A statement from the Ministry of Oil on Thursday added that the project aims to reach a target of 2,000 mcf/d from the fields of Rumaila, Zubair and West Qurna 1.

Shell has a 44-percent stake in the $17-billion, 25-year BGC project, with Iraq having 51 percent, and Japan’s Mitsubishi 5 percent.

(Source: Ministry of Oil)