Writing in Oil Price, Simon Watkins that the recent approval of the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC)'s acquisition of ExxonMobil's 32.7 percent stake in the West Qurna 1 oil field is likely to leave China delighted, the U.S. irritated, and Iraq's oil industry still unable to achieve any of its key oil output goals.China "the Only Winner" in this Huge Iraqi Oil Field first appeared on Iraq Business News.
By John Lee.
Addressing media after Wednesday's cabinet meeting, Minister of Communications Arkan Al-Shaibani (pictured) said the cabinet also allocated an initial payment of $250 million "according to the acquisition amount to cover the Basra Oil Company's share in the work program and the budget for the year 2022 according to new developments provided that ExxonMobil relinquishes its litigation against the Basra Oil Company at the International Court of Arbitration."
Note that other media list the acquiring entity as the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC).
(Sources: Govt of Iraq, Reuters, S&P Global Platts)The post Iraq to buy Exxon stake in West Qurna 1 first appeared on Iraq Business News.
By John Lee.
DNO ASA, the Norwegian oil and gas operator, today announced that the Kurdistan Regional Government has approved the Company's acquisition of ExxonMobil's remaining 32 percent interest in the Baeshiqa license, doubling DNO's stake.
In parallel, commerciality has been declared on the license with plans submitted for fast-track development including early production from previously drilled but suspended wells.
DNO has already demonstrated proof of concept of producing these wells through temporary test facilities, having trucked some 15,000 barrels of 40 degree API and 22 degree API oil for export in 2019 and 2020 from the Baeshiqa-2 and Zartik-1 discovery wells.
Following the transaction, the joint venture comprises DNO as operator with a 64 percent (80 percent paying) interest, the Turkish Energy Company (TEC) with a 16 percent (20 percent paying) interest and the Kurdistan Regional Government with a 20 percent carried interest.
Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani, DNO's Executive Chairman, said:
"This acquisition and plans for fast-track development underscore our belief in the potential of the Baeshiqa license and more broadly our long-term commitment to Kurdistan.
"Once we get the green light from the authorities to proceed, first production will be a matter of months rather than years."
DNO's 3,204 meters discovery well, Baeshiqa-2, tested hydrocarbons to surface from multiple stacked Jurassic and Triassic zones. Two zones flowed naturally at rates averaging over 3,000 barrels of oil per day (bopd) of light gravity oil each and another averaged over 1,000 bopd also of light gravity oil. DNO drilled Zartik-1, the second discovery well, 16 kilometers to the southeast of Baeshiqa-2, to a depth of 3,021 meters. This well tested hydrocarbons to surface from several Jurassic zones, with one zone flowing naturally at rates averaging 2,000 bopd of medium gravity oil.
DNO acquired its first 32 percent interest and assumed operatorship of the Baeshiqa license from ExxonMobil in 2018. As consideration for both acquisitions DNO has covered ExxonMobil's share of exploration costs since January 2019 and the seller will receive payment of USD 15 million.
In addition to the 327-square kilometer Baeshiqa license, DNO operates the Tawke license containing the Tawke and Peshkabir fields in Kurdistan. Combined production from these fields averaged 110,300 bopd in the second quarter of 2021.
(Source: DNO)The post KRG Approves DNO Purchase of Exxon Stake in Baeshiqa first appeared on Iraq Business News.
By John Lee.
According to a report from Reuters, the Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi has told the press in Washington DC that he wants another American company to replace ExxonMobil when it exits the West Qurna 1 oilfield.
Meanwhile, S&P Global Platts reports that Exxon filed an arbitration case against the state-owned Basra Oil Company (BOC) related to its stalled attempt to sell its stake in the field.
(Sources: Reuters, S&P Global Platts)The post Kadhimi "wants US Firm to replace Exxon" at West Qurna 1 first appeared on Iraq Business News.
By Ahmed Mousa Jiyad.
Any opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.
IOC's Strategic Positioning in Iraq Upstream Petroleum
Much talk have been circulating recently on "Big Oil" abandoning Iraq upstream petroleum projects after they rushed into the country many years ago. How much truth is in this; who is leaving, remaining and planning a comeback; why and what material evidences are available to provide verifiable realistic explanation are some of the topics this brief intervention attempts to address.
IOCs positioning in Iraq upstream petroleum have seen a dramatic shift since a Grand Opining Big Push Policy- GOBPP was pursued in 2004; offering IOCs opportunities to achieving unprecedented expansion in the petroleum production capacity during short period.
Their involvement and strategic positioning went through three phases: the first, 2004 to end 2008, comprises many memoranda of understanding/cooperation (MoU/Cs ) in search for foothold and as springboard for further opportunities; transparent competitive bidding phase, June 2009 to May 2012, includes four bid rounds and, third phase covers contracts implementation that began from January 2010 up to date.
Ministry of Oil- MoO concluded some 40 MoU/Cs with IOCs from 23 countries, with overwhelming dominance of the US (9); Japan and Norway (4 each); China, UAE, UK and Canada (2 each) and one company from 16 countries.
For IOCs, MoU/Cs represent invaluable direct contact with Iraqi staff and professionals at all layers of responsibility and access to most archives and database relating to upstream petroleum; that helped IOCs exploring where and what they could do to chart their way towards business in Iraq's upstream petroleum and beyond, i.e., to plan their strategic positioning in the sector. Some IOCs had their MoU/C terminated and were blacklisted from further involvement in upstream petroleum projects, due to their agreements with KRG in violation of the government declared policy.
MoU/Cs contributed in formulating and development of a model contract, and by the time they were terminated MoO succeeded, through direct government-to-government talks (with China), in converting Alahdab oilfield from production sharing to service contract. That conversion presents the model for what MoO offers: a long term service contract not a production sharing contract; an outcome many IOCs had not hoped for and probably impacted their decision for further undertaking.
The first bid round, for brown oilfields, was held end June 2009, followed by three bid rounds for green fields, gas fields and exploration blocks respectively; the last was convened end May 2012.
120 IOCs participated in the qualification process for the bid rounds, 55 from 27 countries were qualified: Japan (9); USA (7); Russia (5); China and UK (4 each); Australia, India and Italy (2 each), and 19 other countries with one company each; a different profile from phase one with obvious strategic positioning implications.
The outcome of the four bid rounds and Alahdab are: 14 oilfields contracted to 15 IOCs from 12 countries; a consolidation of strategic positioning. Total contracted plateau production was 12.3mbd and their total proven reserves ca. 67 billion barrels (58% of the country's proven reserves at that time). Three gas fields were contracted to 3 IOCs from 3 countries with total plateau production of 820mcfd and proven reserves of 11.2tcf. Finally, four exploration blocks were contracts with 7 IOCs from 5 countries resulting in discovery of Fayha and Eridu oilfields.
The contracted plateau production of 12.3mbd was IOCs making that proven to be unrealistic and unattainable, thus, consequently revised downward repeatedly!!
During the second phase many meaningful signs for significant shift in IOCs strategic positioning began to emerge, the most apparent consolidation was Russia.
The third phase, i.e., contracts implementation period, witnessed the most dramatic effective and lasting shifts in IOCs strategic positioning.
A complexity of combined reasons had contributed to such an outcome; some are related to IOCs themselves, others related to the Iraqi side (entities, policies and circumstances), while the rest are related to a variety of international factors and geopolitical considerations. Space limitation prevents from indulging in the details of relevant data, facts and documents, but it is useful to mention the most impacting among them: Fracking revolution in the US; ISIS and oil price collapse in mid-June 2014 that inflicted serious blow to Iraq fiscal, security and developmental efforts; OPEC+ impact on Iraq production; Covid-19 and finally energy/green transition and climate change debate.
However, it is vital to highlight briefly the IOCs that strengthened or weakened their positions during this phase.
In the context of Iraqi GOBPP, strategic positioning is taken here to mean IOCs persistent, competitive, enhanced and long-term underrating in Iraq upstream petroleum. Three dimensions manifest IOC involvement and its strategic positioning: horizontal (in multi-fields), vertical (the participating interest-PI in the fields) and volumetric (in terms of proven reserves and production due to field development).
From November 2013 China began enhancing its presence in the country through consolidating CNPC , CNOOC, ZhenHua , Sinopec , UEG and probably CPECC, which invests in utilizing all associated gas produced in Missan Province . In addition to the above, there are many Chines service companies that are involved in upstream petroleum activities such as drilling, supply and construct surface installations, pipelines, field management among others.
Russian Lukoil enhanced its position vertically horizontally and volumetric in West Qurna 2-WQ2 oilfield and in exploration Block 10 that led to Eridu oilfield discovery; Lukoil found other reservoirs beyond the field's current borders and thus requested to expand Eridu field. Surprisingly, the Oil Minister reportedly said recently Lukoil intends to sell its PI in WQ2 to a Chines company!
Other Russian IOCs with bid round contracts include Gazprom (operator of Badra oilfield) and Bashneft/ Rosneft (for Exploration Block 12), KRG not included here.
In addition to Chines and Russian IOCs Japanese companies increased their presence as well: Japex (Gharraf oilfield); INPEX (Exploration Block 10/Eridu oilfield) and Itochu bought entire Shell' PI (20%) in WQ1.
Against the consolidation of the Chines, Russian and Japanese companies, other IOCs lost or weakened their presence in upstream petroleum; these include Big Oil- as ExxonMobil, Shell and Oxy and medium-small size companies such as Petronas, Kogas, Kuwait Energy, TPAO.
Occidental Petroleum relinquished, in 2016, its PI in Zubair oilfield to South Oil Company (now Basra Oil Company), due to its decision pulling out from projects in the Middle East for financial reasons.
ExxonMobil demise began almost ten years ago soon after it had attained significant consolidation; a demise of its own making!! Apart from the contribution of the Iraqi factors ExxonMobil faced and facing many other challenges that exacerbate its decision to abandon Iraq. These include restructuring its international profile; energy transition (away from fossil-based to renewable-energy) environmentally-conscious; shareholder revolts, expulsion of ExxonMobil representative from EITI'MSG due to position regarding Dobb-Franck issue and the forthcoming SEC environmental compliance rules.
Royal Shell story is not very different from that of ExxonMobil. Shell launched initially a powerful strategic positioning, resisted the temptation of engaging with KRG petroleum and diversified its portfolio in oil, gas and petrochemical projects. Now it has much weakened role; withdrew from Majnoon oilfield, sold its PI in WQ1, rumors that it contemplate leaving Basra Gas Compan- BGC , whose HoA was signed in 2008 but it did not deliver the contracted target, and Nibras petrochemical project, with MIM & MoO, draggeed for too many years without any prospect.
Again, Shell decision to leave WQ1 and Majnoon oilfields and possibly BGC was not entirely due to contractual and working conditions in Iraq; one possible explanation relates to Shell' overall plan to restructure its global business, following its takeover of British Gas Group- BGG. Also Shell faces legal action; A Dutch court ruled, recently, that Shell will have to reduce its carbon emissions by 45 percent from 2019 levels by 2030.
BP has only one engagement- Rumaila oilfield, with almost equal PI with CNPC (while during the June 2009 bidding round BP' PI was double that of CNPC). Recently, BP decided to spin off its involvement in Rumaila into a stand-alone company, a "ring fencing practice", for reasons relating to diverting its global assets and investment plans. Though this move is more structural and organizational in nature that has, contractually, no effect on Iraq, it, nevertheless, could indicate possible departure from Rumaila sooner or later.
Total, rebranded TotalEnergies, have very modest PI in only one oilfield- Halfaya, is trying a comeback to Iraq through concluding HoA comprising four major projects, three of which are part of SIIP that Iraq wasted too many years discussing with ExxonMobil!!
Surely, IOCs strategic positioning has significant implications for petroleum sector and the prospect of the entire economy. There has been a tendency for some to be highly selective by focusing only on one Iraqi based, real reason, such as harsh contractual terms; type of contracts; corruption, resource mismanagement and security conditions among others. While all these are real and effective, they are absolutely not the only factors behind IOCs shift and change of priorities as there is a complex wed that one should be aware of; 20 IOCs have recently warned for tax violation and IOCs that lost their strategic positioning inside Iraqi petroleum had themselves contributed to that outcome.
Moreover, global energy/green transition and international geopolitics have powerful ramifications though the debate is, as usual, not conclusive. While IEA recent report could have effective impact, REN21 new report raises doubt; and such wide divergence suggests oil remains needed much longer than some thinks.
Mr Jiyad is an independent development consultant, scholar and Associate with the former Centre for Global Energy Studies (CGES), London. He was formerly a senior economist with the Iraq National Oil Company and Iraq's Ministry of Oil, Chief Expert for the Council of Ministers, Director at the Ministry of Trade, and International Specialist with UN organizations in Uganda, Sudan and Jordan. He is now based in Norway (Email: mou-jiya(at)online.no, Skype ID: Ahmed Mousa Jiyad). Read more of Mr Jiyad's biography here.The post IOC's Strategic Positioning in Iraqi Upstream Petroleum first appeared on Iraq Business News.
By John Lee.
Basra Oil Company (BOC) director, Khalid Hamza, told Reuters that the US company is attempting to sell its 32.7-percent stake for $350 million.
(Source: Reuters)The post Iraq "formally asks" to buy Exxon's West Qurna stake first appeared on Iraq Business News.
By John Lee.
Ihssan Abdul-Jabbar Ismail told a news conference on Monday that the government might purchase the stake via the state-owned Basra Oil Company (BOC).
Earlier this year, ExxonMobil sold its share in the Baeshiqa license in the Kurdistan region of Iraq to DNO.
(Sources: Reuters, Bloomberg)The post Iraq may Buy Exxon stake in West Qurna 1 first appeared on Iraq Business News.
By Ahmed Mousa Jiyad.
Any opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.
The Demise of ExxonMobil in the Iraqi Petroleum Sector
Ten years ago this highly recognized IOC had golden opportunity to operate three giant oilfields in the southern Iraq with a combined production plateau of 6.275 million barrels daily (mbd); an opportunity unavailable anywhere in the world, but now this company exiting the country empty-handed!!
Why was that? What went wrong? Who is to blame? Should any lessons be learned from this failed venture and what are the implications for Iraq as well as for ExxonMobil?
This article attempts to answer briefly the above questions and provide background review that could help in understand the complexity of the circumstances that contributed to and led to this eventuality.
ExxonMobil back in Iraq
IOCs comeback to Iraqi upstream petroleum began in earnest immediately after 2003 invasion.
ExxonMobil was one of too many IOCs that concluded Memorandum of Understanding/ Cooperation- MoU/C with MoO in 2004. That MoU/C was signed on 27 October 2004, renewed twice and remained valid until end of 2008; it comprises conducting seven joint studies and training. The joint studies includes: phases 1 &2 for the development of Zubair Oilfield; Seismic and evaluation study for exploration (old) block 12; Database; Model Tender Document for exploration block 12; Rehabilitating Oil Training Center in Baghdad; Balad Oilfield; Deep drilling program for South Rumaila. Also, ExxonMobil committed to provide training for 129 MoO employees, totaling 1068 working days, during 2005 and 2006.
When MoO decided to hold the first bid round, ExxonMobil was one of seven American companies that were qualified, among 35 IOCs, for participating in the bid round that was held on 29 and 30 June 2009.
ExxonMobil formed three consortia and submitted bids for three oilfields but won nothing during the two days of the competition.
The second consortium with Shell and Petronas for Zubair oilfield competing with three other consortia: Eni/Sinopec/Occidental/Kogas; CNPC/BP; Gazprom/ ONGC/ Turkish Petroleum. The third consortium with Shell for West Qurna1 oilfield competing with four other consortia: CNPC/Petronas/Japex; Lukoil/Conoco; Total; Repsol/StatoilHydro/Maersk.
None won during the biding event.
In October 2009, ENI accepted the MoO' maximum remuneration fee and agreed to expel Sinopec from its consortium, because Sinopec agreed, days after the biding event, to a C$8.3bn (US$7.2bn) takeover of Addax, which had a stake in the KR TaqTaq field. Hence, ENI consortium secured the Zubair contract.
As for WQ1 it was a totally different story.
Early October 2009 a BBC Monitoring report quoted Lukoil boss Vagit Alekperov had said, "We have let it be known to Iraq's Oil Ministry that the consortium of Lukoil and ConocoPhillips is ready to enter into direct talks concerning the West Qurna-1 project on the terms that were announced earlier by Iraq's Oil Ministry,"
Probably, ExxonMobil found itself left behind and empty-handed from the first bid round since BP/CNPC won Rumaila; ENI lead consortium secured Zubair and now Lukoil and ConocoPhillips conceding to MoO terms regarding WQ1. Moreover, ExxonMobil had no intention to participate in the second bid round to be held in December 2010.
All the above prompted ExxonMobil/Shell, four weeks after Lukoil and ConocoPhillips announcement, to present similar acceptance of MoO terms regarding the maximum remuneration fee.
The Ministry favoured ExxonMobil/Shell by not considering Lukoil/ConocoPhillips offer promptly, and when ExxonMobil/Shell made their offer it was selected; presumably due to suggested production plateau target-PPT differential that tilted towards ExxonMobil/Shell!!! The Cabinet approved the award of WQ1 to ExxonMobil/Shell on 25 January 2010.
But ExxonMobil negotiated secretly with KRG after the company secured WQ1 contract with the federal ministry and it had signed the second amendment to the contract on 18 August 2010 adding 500kbd to an already high PPT at a higher remuneration fee of $2/b.
ExxonMobil-KRG secret negotiation led to signing six production sharing agreements on 18 October 2011, though it knows of the blacklisting policy by the federal ministry of oil, i.e, ignoring and disregarding the federal government imposed policy.
Contracts with KRG add insult into injury since three of these contracts are related to exploration blocks and fields that fall within the "disputed territories"; these are Bashiqa, Al Qosh and Qara Hanjeer, the other three are Arbat East, Pirmam and Betwata.
That unwise and puzzling move by ExxonMobil led to excluding it from leading the Common Seawater Supply Project-CSSP; reducing its Participating Interest in WQ1 (through the Third Amendment of the contract dated 28 November 2013) and blacklisting it from any future upstream projects such as Nassiriya Integrated Project-NIP.
That unwise action was writing on the wall that had in fact commenced the demise of this giant IOC in the Iraqi upstream petroleum.
The position of ExxonMobil in WQ1 weekend further when Shell exited WQ1 after it had exited Majnoon oilfield in June 2018.
ExxonMobil attempted a comeback to Iraqi petroleum, by exploiting the naivety and narcissism of a former Minister of Oil, Jabbar Luaibi, through Southern Iraq Integrated Project- SIIP. He and ExxonMobil were close to trap Iraq in an Odious Contract. The Ministry of Oil was cautioned of the detrimental consequences of such a contract and luckily for Iraq that contract was dismissed.
The rise and fall of ExxonMobil in KRI was even more dramatic despite the fact that KRG offered lucrative production sharing agreements. Media sources' report that ExxonMobil had conducted geological studies that doubted the existence of enough reserves in most of these blocks. Such results prompted Exxon to relinquish three of its six blocks: Betwata in 2015, and Qara Hanjeer and Arbat East in 2016.
Of Exxon's six blocks, Bashiqa may be the most promising. However, in 2017, it transferred half of its 80 percent interest in this block - along with operatorship - to DNO and early this year it agreed to sell 32 percent to DNO, which practically and effectively ends ExxonMobil involvement in this block. Finally, ten years on with no much progress in AlQosh and Primam.
ExxonMobil adventure in Kurdistan Iraq ended, mostly, miserably!
To sum up, in that first biding round the company had three valuable opportunities and, analytically and legally, it and its partners could have won all three super-giant oilfields (Rumaila, Zubair and WQ1) with a combined production plateau of 6.275 million barrels daily-mbd against a combined minimum PPT proposed by MoO of 2.758 mbd; it won nothing during the bidding event!!!!!!!!!.
Instead, ExxonMobil sought a divisive course of action in the domestic Iraqi politics by concluding ill-fated PSAs with KRG; was that due to lack of vision, or geopolitical nativity or arrogance that still reflects a "Seven Sisters" mentality, or a hidden political agenda aiming at disintegrating the country; who knows!!!!!
What went wrong with ExxonMobil and its economic model?
Many views argued that the fiscal terms of the Iraqi long term service contract-LTSC for WQ1 are tough enough that eradicate the Internal Rate of Returns-IRR of the economic model which the IOC premised its final investment decision-FID on it.
This might be partially true as the comparative analysis of LTSC with other types of contract, particularly the production sharing contracts-PSCs indicates the "Government take" are higher under the LTSC than the PSCs. This, from international energy political economy perspectives is good for Iraq and, moreover, that corresponds with the Iraqi constitutional provision that calls for "develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people" (Article 112, Second)
Nevertheless, contractually and analytically LTSC for WQ1is identical in structure, contents and fiscal terms, except the particularities of WQ1 oilfield, to all LTSCs for the brown fields offered under the first bid round, i.e, Rumaila, Zubair and the 3 Missan oilfields- Buzurgan, Abu Ghrab and Faqa. This leads one to question why ExxonMobil finds the fiscal terms unfavorable while other IOCs continue in the redevelopment of the oilfields.
It took almost one year to prepare for the first bid round and the final text of the LTSC was thoroughly examined by all qualified IOCs for that bid round. Logically and imperially, all IOCs should have formulated their economic model and bid on what the LTSC offers. It is rather surprising to claim, ten years later, that the offered fiscal terms do not match with the company economic model!!
The economic model of any IOC is its own making; reflecting its vision, its global profile, strategic positioning, strengths, and stakeholder/shareholder's interests among other things. Accordingly, the level of IRR is the fiscal measure upon which the FID premised. Majors or Big Oil usually have high IRR, due to their international profile , their integrated structure across the value chain of petroleum industry and the "opportunity cost" of a particular investment.
IRR under LTSC fiscal terms depends mostly and directly on: production level, capital cost-investment, cost recovery and remuneration fee; indirectly it depends on oil prices through the term of "deemed revenues" provision that impact the quarterly cost recovery and remuneration fee entitlement.
Oil price fluctuates, and nothing new about that at all; its fluctuation like a "Yu-Yu" is more normal and usual than otherwise. Iraqi oil export price averaged at $53.19 a barrel during the 12 months period November 2008-October 2009; the time that IOCs considered oil prices in their economic model. During the period from July 2008 to March 2021 Iraqi oil export price averaged at $69.55 a barrel; hence the argument that IRR eradication was attributed to oil prices and, accordingly on cost recovery and remuneration fee is not convincing.
What remains is the impact of oil production level on IRR value. Oil production levels have implications and direct impact on capital cost, cost recovery and remuneration fee, and hence on IRR.
For WQ1 the MoO requests a minimum plateau target of 600kbd during the first bid round. ExxonMobil presented 2.325mbd, i.e., nearly four folds what MoO had envisaged!! Moreover, soon after signing the contract ExxonMobil requested adding further 500kbd leading to higher plateau target at 2.825mbd.
ExxonMobil should have known that such unreasonable unattainable plateau target within the contracted timeframe weakens the logical premises of its economic model and the assumed IRR; it was a problem of its own making and shed much doubt about the validity and soundness of its model not the LTSC stringent fiscal terms.
However, Amendment 4, signed on 19 February 2014, to WQ1 contract, provides further relieves from the terms of the contract such as reducing the plateau target, performance factor and R-Factor among others that provide significant fiscal incentives to WQ1 consortium.
All the above refutes the argument that put the blame squarely on the terms of the contract in the deteriorating IRR and ExxonMobil economic model.
Even if one, for the sake of the argument, accepts for a while the tough terms of WQ1 contract, what about ExxonMobil economic model for KRG' PSCs!!
All commentators and oil experts agree that KRG' PSCs provide lucrative terms for the benefits of the IOCs. Why then ExxonMobil fails measurably there too?
Was that demise due to wrongly-premised economic model or "inside-misguidedness"!! Media sources revealed that Ali Khedery, a former American diplomatic advisor in Iraq who subsequently joined Exxon as director of public and government affairs for ExxonMobil Kurdistan Region of Iraq Limited (EMKRIL), Exxon's KRG-focused subsidiary, "had facilitated the negotiations that brought the company to Kurdistan." Was ExxonMobil victimized by its own staffer!!!!???
ExxonMobil Exit and MoO Options
Contractually, to exit WQ1, ExxonMobil should invoke the termination Article 8 in WQ1 service contract, particularly sub-article (8.2) and, therein, sub-article (8.1 (c)). If ExxonMobil wishes to assign its rights and obligations, as it seems doing so far, it should comply with the provisions of Article 28-Assignment.
Available information indicates that the company launched the contractually exiting process in January by sending a formal letter to notify MoO it had found prospective buyers; ExxonMobil and MoO had three months, until 28 April, to agree on a course of action.
The ministry has three options: the first is to accept the prospective buyers found by ExxonMobil; 20 percent to CNOOC and 12.7 percent to PetroChina-CNPC. This means increasing CNPC participating interest to 45.4% and increase China position in WQ1 to 65.4%.
The second option is to find another American company to acquire ExxonMobil share; this what the Ministry has publically announced and it seems to favour Chevron, but Chevron was reportedly not hugely encouraged to invest in WQ1. (But again Chevron was blacklisted by the Ministry due to the company' involvement in KRG oilfields, though such blacklisting was revoked, unofficially, during the time of former minister Jabbar Luaibi. He paving the way for this company to enter the upstream petroleum through direct backdoor. By the way the Iraqi team in MoU/C with Chevron 2004-2008 was chaired by Jabbar Luaibi).
The third option is to acquire ExxonMobil share by the Ministry through Basra Oil Company-BOC or any other national companies affiliated under the Ministry. This option is similar to what was done when Occidental - Oxy relinquished its participating interest in Zubair oilfield
In any of these options, the Ministry should extract a "capital gain tax-CGT" from the total value of the sold share. The Iraqi tax authority decides the CGT rate, the estimation equation and the compounding rate to arrive at the present values taking into consideration three related variables: the value of the sold share (minus) the present value of the invested capital (plus) the present value of the recovered invested capital (cost recovery).
In my article written almost twelve years ago assessing the first bid round I wrote the following: "What is rather surprising is the somewhat weak contribution of the American oil companies. While they topped the 35 qualified IOCs with 7 companies, only three had participated in the bidding. Were they expected to capitalise on the American military presence and political pressure to have guaranteed access to the Iraqi oil? Or they simply have their own capacity, technical and financial limitations? Or Iraq is not on their strategic priority screen? Or they are trapped in a mind-set of own making that centred on production sharing agreements and "reserves booking"? Or they are not used to this type of open bidding and transparency, and they prefer behind closed doors deals? Only time would provide the satisfactory answer." (MEES 52:33 17 August 2009)
Any lessons learned, Ministry of Oil????????
Mr Jiyad is an independent development consultant, scholar and Associate with the former Centre for Global Energy Studies (CGES), London. He was formerly a senior economist with the Iraq National Oil Company and Iraq's Ministry of Oil, Chief Expert for the Council of Ministers, Director at the Ministry of Trade, and International Specialist with UN organizations in Uganda, Sudan and Jordan. He is now based in Norway (Email: mou-jiya(at)online.no, Skype ID: Ahmed Mousa Jiyad). Read more of Mr Jiyad's biography here.The post The Demise of ExxonMobil in the Iraqi Petroleum Sector first appeared on Iraq Business News.
By John Lee.
The Iraqi Cabinet held its weekly meeting on Tuesday under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi.
The deal is valued at more than $480 million.
(Source: Office of the Prime Minister)
DNO ASA, the Norwegian oil and gas operator, has announced the acquisition of ExxonMobil's 32 percent interest in the Baeshiqa license in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, doubling DNO's operated stake to 64 percent (80 percent paying interest), pending government approval.
The Company plans to continue an exploration and appraisal program on the license while fast tracking early production from existing wells in 2021.
DNO has already demonstrated proof of concept of producing through temporary test facilities, having delivered 15,000 barrels of 40o API oil and 22o API oil for export from the Baeshiqa-2 and Zartik-1 wells, respectively.
In November 2019 DNO issued a notice of discovery on the Baeshiqa license after flowing hydrocarbons from several Jurassic and Triassic zones to surface in the 3,204 meters (2,549 meters TVDSS) Baeshiqa-2 exploration well. Following acid stimulation, the zone flowed variable rates of light oil and sour gas.
Two zones flowed naturally at rates averaging over 3,000 barrels of oil per day (bopd) of light gravity oil each and another averaged over 1,000 bopd also of light gravity oil. Subsequent analyses on surface samples collected during testing confirm that the Triassic reservoirs contain saturated oil with a gas cap.
An exploration well was completed in 2020 on a second structure (Zartik) some 15 kilometers southeast of the Baeshiqa-2 discovery well. The 3,021 meters (2,322 meters TVDSS) well tested hydrocarbons to surface from several Jurassic zones, with the uppermost zone flowing naturally at rates averaging over 2,000 bopd of medium gravity oil.
The Company currently estimates gross license contingent recoverable resources from three of the tested zones in the two wells ranging from 12 million barrels of oil (mmbbls) (1C) to 156 mmbbls (3C), with a 2C volume of 43 mmbbls.
"By increasing our stake in the Baeshiqa license now, we demonstrate our belief in its ultimate potential," said Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani (pictured), DNO's Executive Chairman. "Following the stabilization of oil prices and export payments in Kurdistan, DNO is stepping up spending on new opportunities," he added.
DNO acquired its first 32 percent interest from ExxonMobil and assumed operatorship of the Baeshiqa license in 2018.
The 324 square kilometer license is situated 60 kilometers west of Erbil and 20 kilometers east of Mosul. The license contains two large structures, Baeshiqa and Zartik, which have multiple independent stacked target reservoir systems, including in the Cretaceous, Jurassic and Triassic. The remaining partners in the license include TEC [Turkish Energy Company] with a 20 percent paying (16 percent net) interest and the Kurdistan Regional Government with a 20 percent carried interest.
In addition to the Baeshiqa license, DNO also operates the Tawke license containing the Tawke and Peshkabir fields in Kurdistan. Gross operated production from the Tawke license averaged 110,300 bopd in 2020.
(Source: DNO)The post DNO Buys Exxon's Stake in Iraqi Oilfield first appeared on Iraq Business News.